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ARTICLE
The Booster, the Snitch, and the Bogus False Arrest Victim:
Retailers and Shoplifters in Interwar America and Britain
Peter M. Scott
This article examines shoplifting from department stores and variety chain stores in interwar
America and Britain. Patterns of shoplifting show strong similarities—with stores facing a
predominantly female, and disproportionately affluent, army of amateur shoplifters, together
with a much smaller corps of professional thieves. The incidence and characteristics of shoplift-
ing are explored, together with the stores’ legal and other strategies to deter shoplifters. The
article also examines why apparently prosperous women had the highest propensity to shoplift.
Britain and the United States had strong commonalities in terms of open display retail formats,
the methods used to deter shoplifters, and typical legal penalties. However, America had one
critical difference—the much higher incidence of a type of store criminal who specialized in
deliberately getting apprehended in order to sue the store for false arrest and, often, false
imprisonment, slander, and a range of related charges. This reflected the higher damages
typically awarded by U.S. courts compared with their British counterparts, inflated by local
antagonism to retail corporations, togetherwith a system—at least in someU.S. cities—whereby
corrupt lawyers and judges connived in shoplifting acquittals that paved the way for lawsuits.
Keywords: Shoplifting, retailing, White collar crime, consumer goods
Introduction
Despite the enduring popular fascination with shoplifting—evidenced from the eighteenth
century in literature, plays, and later films—it remains one of the least explored property
crimes. There are few historical studies of shoplifting, and these mainly focus on either the
history of the kleptomania diagnosis and defense or use evidence from contemporary news-
paper reports.1 Similarly, there have been relatively few contemporary academic studies.2
Thorstein Sellin, writing in 1937, noted that, comparedwith other crimes, “There is a singular
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Business History
Conference. All rights reserved. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Whitlock, “Gender, Medicine, and Consumer Culture”; O’Brien, “The Kleptomania Diagnosis; Abel-
son, “Invention of Kleptomania.”
2. Sellin, Research Memorandum on Crime, 14.
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lack of shoplifting studies. Business houses have been found reluctant to give information.”3
More than eighty years later, despite some notable contributions, this topic remains under-
explored.4
Popular interest in shoplifting largely stems from the distinctive characteristics of the typical
shoplifter. Evidence has consistently shown that, in contrast to other crimes of material gain
(with the exception of prostitution), shoplifterswere overwhelmingly female.Moreover, typical
shoplifters were “amateurs” (stealing for their own use, rather than to sell on themerchandise),
and members of the middle and upper classes were considerably overrepresented.
This article examines interwar shoplifting from department stores and variety chain stores
in the United States and Britain. The interwar era has been almost entirely neglected in
historical accounts of shoplifting, which generally focus on the nineteenth century, or earlier
periods, in contrast to the significant body of recent work on other aspects of interwar crime.5
In addition to the standard sources, this study also uses archival data for U.S. and British
retailers; reports from their trade associations; legal texts; articles in the retailing trade press;
and a contemporary academic study of a U.S. professional shoplifter.
Patterns of shoplifting in theUnitedStates andUnitedKingdomhad strong similarities—with
stores facingapredominantly female, andoftenprosperous, armyof amateurshoplifters, together
with a much smaller corps of professional thieves. The methods used to deter shoplifters were
also similar, as were typical legal penalties. However, America had one critical difference—the
much higher incidence of a type of store criminal who specialized in deliberately getting caught,
so that she/he could sue the store for false arrest and, often, false imprisonment, slander, and
related charges. This reflected both the higher damages typically awarded by U.S. courts com-
paredwithBritain, togetherwitha system—at least in someU.S. cities—wherebycorrupt lawyers
and judges connived in shoplifting acquittals that paved the way for lawsuits.
This study first examines the development of large store, open display retailing formats in
theUnited States andBritain, focusing ondepartment stores and variety chain stores, which—
together with some clothing stores—were the prime targets for shoplifters. After outlining the
incidence and characteristics of interwar shoplifting, it discusses why affluent women were
disproportionately represented among the ranks of amateur shoplifters. This is followed by
exploration of an underexamined related phenomenon—people deliberately getting arrested
for shoplifting, so they could bring lawsuits against the store—andhow this tempered efforts to
control shoplifting and shifted policing activities from apprehension to deterrence.
Department Stores, Variety Chains, and the Expansion of Open Display Retailing
Shoplifting has traditionally been associatedwith store formats selling high-value, high-status
items using open display techniques, such as bazaars, “bargain shops,” emporiums, and
3. Sellin, Research Memorandum on Crime, 112.
4. Key studies include Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch; Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving;
Segrave, Shoplifting; Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture.
5. For example, Abelson,When Ladies Go A-Thieving; Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture.
Examples of recent literature on interwar crime include: Adler, “Less Crime,More Punishment”; Wood “‘Those
Who Have Had Trouble Can Sympathise’”; Davies, “Glasgow’s ‘Reign of Terror’”; Houlbrook, “Commodifying
the Self Within”; Wildman, “Miss Moriarty.”
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department stores.6 Awidely perceived trend of rising shoplifting from the 1870s to the 1930s
was popularly associated with the rise of large, palatial shops using open display methods;
particularly department stores—which became a significant force in both the United States
and Britain during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.7
Open display had always been an essential element of the U.S. department store business.
However, by the 1890s, display techniquewas taken to a new level, using innovations in plate
glass, mirrors, lighting, synthetic colors, and more coordinated sales floor and departmental
layouts, to accentuate the appearance of their stores andmerchandise.8 Innovations in display
continued into the interwar era, seeking to imbue merchandise with transformative messages
and associations that would increase its value in the eyes of customers.9 Meanwhile, depart-
ment stores had grown substantially in size,making it more difficult for sales staff to recognize
and monitor their customers, who increasingly expected to handle the merchandise without
asking the shop assistant. Other innovations, such as cut-price sales, bargain counters, and
bargain basements, were also associated with increased shoplifting, partly owing to the
crowds they generated10
The new department stores developed an intensified commercial culture, largely based
around luxury goods with strong “positional” characteristics—showing the person’s status by
their instant recognition as “symbolic” status markers by their peer group.11 Several studies
have noted the social significance of goods typically stolen bymiddle-class female shoplifters
—such as lace, silk handkerchiefs, and a variety of small, fashionable items—items instru-
mental in enhancing the person’s appearance, as recognized markers of social status. From a
middle-class female perspective, these were not luxuries, but “necessities” for asserting or
enhancing social status—not individually, but as part of a coordinated assemblage, that
reflected on both the person and her family.12 Mary Cameron’s 1964 study highlighted the
dominance of highly visible status goods in shoplifting cases. Her analysis of women’s court
data showed that women’s coats and suits; women’s dresses; other women’s clothing; dress
accessories; and purses collectively featured in 97.3 percent of all cases; while data from a
major local department store showed that these goods, plus jewelry, featured in 89.8 percent of
cases (though in both samples some women had stolen multiple categories of goods).13
While British and American department stores emerged at around the same time, open
display techniques became significant in Britain during the 1910s (despite some moves in
this direction during the Edwardian era).14 Rapid diffusion was triggered by the examples of
Gordon Selfridge, who opened a grand American-style department store in London’s fash-
ionable West End in 1909, and F. W. Woolworth, who opened his first UK store in the same
6. Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 151.
7. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 64–65.
8. Leach, “Transformations in a Culture of Consumption,” 323–325; Abelson, When Ladies Go
A-Thieving, 63–90; Benson, Counter Cultures, 40–41.
9. Leach, “Transformations in a Culture of Consumption,” 327; Benson, Counter Cultures, 41–47.
10. Whitlock, “Forms of Crime,” 164; Abelson When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 64–65, 127.
11. Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class; Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth; Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital”;
Abelson, When Ladies go a Thieving, 165.
12. Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 219–221.
13. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 78–87.
14. Lancaster, Department Store, 69; Lomax, “View from the Shop,” 280.
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year.15 Both were spectacularly successful, especially UK Woolworths, which became
Britain’s largest retailer by the 1930s.16 Woolworths’ methods and success inspired Marks
& Spencer (hereafter M&S) to transform from a “penny bazaar” into an American-style
variety chain during the second half of the 1920s. However, to avoid head-on competition
with Woolworths, it adopted the price and merchandise polices of American “to a dollar”
stores such as W. T. Grant and Kresge, with a maximum price point of five shillings
(roughly equivalent to a dollar), which made it more attractive to shoplifters than Wool-
worths 3d and 6d items.17
In 1935 there were some 4201 U.S. department stores, accounting for 10 percent of retail
sales.18 However, they were facing increasing competition from the chain stores, particularly
“variety store” chains such as Woolworths, Kresge, and W.T. Grant, many of which (with the
notable exception of Woolworths) had abandoned their 10¢ maximum price point and now
sold goods priced up to $1, or in some cases $5, with some abandoning any price limit.19 This
allowed them to tap into the growing market for cheap women’s ready-to-wear clothing and
other fashion goods, using displaymethods similar to those of department stores.20 Theywere
also looking, and behaving, more like low-end department stores; for example, using promo-
tional techniques such as cut-price sales, supported by full-page newspaper ads, heavy with
prices.21
The Incidence of Interwar Shoplifting
The extent of shoplifting is impossible to measure with any precision, because most thefts
went unreported. Even those thatwere detectedwere oftennot actedonby storedetectives and
other staff, because they were typically instructed not to take action unless they were certain
theft had been committed. Evenwhen shoplifterswere apprehended,most first-time offenders
were not formally arrested, and even fewer cases reached the courts. Considerations of cost,
risk, and adverse publicity acted as strong disincentives to prosecution.22 Moreover, most
estimates of retailers’ losses are problematic, as they often include not only shoplifting, but
employee theft (and, in some cases, the costs of store detectives).
However, two U.S. analyses provide indicative figures. The first concerned a local depart-
ment store chain, operating five stores in a largemidwesternmetropolitan area,mainly serving
customers earning under $2000per year.23As shown inTable 1, over 1930–1934, an average of
1428 “outsiders” (shoplifters) were caught, together with 28 dishonest employees. Employee
theft was said to be harder to identify, but the figures suggest that shoplifting greatly
15. Lomax, “View from the Shop,” 278.
16. Scott and Walker, “Barriers to ‘Industrialisation.’”
17. Ibid.
18. Hypps, “Department Store,” 76.
19. Darby, Story of the Chain Store, 17–23.
20. Howard, From Main Street to Mall, 73–77.
21. Guernsey, Retailing Tomorrow, 56.
22. Meier, “Going on the Hoist,” 414.
23. Duncan, “Control of Stock Shortages,” 4.
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outweighed staff pilfering, in contrast to modern estimates that around half of all store thefts
are down to employees.24 Some 34 percent of those apprehendedwere sixteen or under and—
assuming no juveniles were prosecuted—18 percent of adults would face prosecution.
Table 2 provides data for three Philadelphia department stores. Known thefts averaged
5314 over 1928–1933, of which 1432 involved arrests. However, successful prosecutions
amounted to only 16 percent of those apprehended, or 4.3 percent of known thefts. The table
also casts doubt of the usefulness of police data, which show an average of only 4402 known
shop thefts per year in Philadelphia (excluding those convicted), which is lower than thefts
from just these three stores. Trade estimates put shoplifting losses for the major New York
stores at around $1 million (claimed to be a conservative estimate), though this included
employee theft and the costs of detectives.25 Meanwhile, in March 1936, the National Retail
DryGoodsAssociation (representing department stores) estimated national shoplifting, fraud,
and allied thefts in department stores at $10 million.26
New York Police Department (hereafter NYPD) data showed 1184 women and 239 men
arrested for shoplifting in 1929 (2.1 per ten thousand population), comparedwith 943women
Table 1. Number of persons caught stealing from “Middle-Western Department Stores” (pseudonym),
1930–1934.
No. of persons caught Method of handling Age Net sales
Year Outsiders Employees Released Court cases Up to 16 Over 16 ($)
1930 1,124 32 982 173 382 773 19,950,877
1931 1,527 14 1,352 189 562 978 18,931,671
1932 1,682 30 1,556 156 376 1,236 14,410,267
1933 1,395 32 1,240 187 471 956 14,323,793
1934 1,412 33 1,284 161 625 820 15,787,288
Average 1,428 28 1,283 173 483 953 16,680,779
Source: Duncan, “Control of Stock Shortages,” 18, 281.










1928 4,935 1,147 227 6,318
1929 4,828 1,035 223 6,429
1930 5,172 1,077 252 7,505
1931 5,381 1,180 226 7,088
1932 5,277 1,267 253 5,604
1933 5,314 1,432 230 4,402
a Includes data for the entire city, excepting the numer of persons “prosecuted and convicted.”
Source: Thorstein Sellin, Research Memorandum on Crime in the Depression, Social Science Research Council Bulletin 27, 1937, p. 69.
24. E.g., Hudson, “Top Sources of Retail Shrinkage.”
25. “175 Shoplifters Crowd Courtroom,” New York Times, January 13 1921, 1; Hadden, “Shoplifters of
Many Types Mingle with the Shoppers,” New York Times, December 17, 1933, 163.
26. “Stores to Fight Thefts,” New York Times, March 22, 1936, 65.
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and 221 men in 1924—though this may also include store employees.27 However, a detective
at a major New York store reported in 1925 that eight hundred to one thousand arrests for
shoplifting were made annually in his store, half of them on Saturdays, again suggesting that
proportionately few went to court.28 Figures for Greater London, for the broader category of
“recorded cases,” show an average of 1.8 per ten thousand population from 1933 (the first
available year) to 1938, with no clear trend. The figures suggest that London had a lower
incidence of shoplifting than New York, though of the same broad order of magnitude.29
However, shoplifting in New York and London is likely to have been more widespread than
in provincial cities, as professional thieves could avoid recognition by moving from store to
store.30
There is no strong evidence of a spike in shoplifting during the Depression. New York’s
“StoresMutual Protective Association,” encompassing sixteen of the largest NewYork stores,
plus some smaller firms, noted that before 1930 it had added an average of 3500 new shop-
lifters to its files each year, while the Depression increased this to around 4000.31 However,
New York attracted professional shoplifters from all parts of the United States, owing to its
large number of department stores, enabling thieves to shoplift for weeks without becoming
known to store detectives. Tables 1 and 2 show only a mild increase in shoplifting across the
Depression. One career shoplifter reported that the Depression adversely impacted profes-
sional shoplifters, as the resale value of stolen merchandise fell sharply, while the costs of
bribing their way out of imprisonment when arrested remained as high as ever.32 Meanwhile,
thefts of food bydestitute peoplewould be very unlikely to leave any record, as a typical grocer
could not afford to spend half a day testifying in court.
Boosters and Snitches
The most important distinction within the shoplifting community, recognized by stores,
courts, and shoplifters themselves, was between the professional shoplifter, known colloqui-
ally in the United States as “the booster,” and the amateur pilferer or “snitch.”33 A June 1920
New York Times article reported that only 10 percent of shoplifters in New York stores were
“hardened thieves,” and 90 percent were women.34 “Professional shoplifters” (typically
defined as anyone who stole to sell on) included a higher proportion of men than amateur
shoplifters, though women appear to have also dominated this category.
27. Segrave, Shoplifting, 35.
28. “Shoplifting in the Big Stores,” New York Times, June 21, 1925, 73.
29. UKParliament,Report of the Commissioner… 1935, 65; UKParliament,Report of the Commissioner…
1938, 71. Population of the Metropolitan Police Zone, in UK Royal Commission on the Distribution of the
Industrial Population, Report, 161.
30. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 41–42.
31. Hadden, “Shoplifters of Many Types Mingle with the Shoppers,” 163.
32. Sutherland, Professional Thief, 145.
33. Ibid., 1–8.
34. “Stores Open War on Amateur Pilferers,” New York Times, July 11, 1920, 43.
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Some of the most expert shoplifters—admired by both the criminal fraternity and the store
detectives—werewomen. For example, London had an elite group of professional shoplifters,
known as “hoisters.” The most famous were the “Forty Thieves” (also called the “Forty
Elephants,” on account of their rotund appearance once they had hidden merchandise in
various concealed pockets in their clothing), who were well connected with London’s under-
world and targeted high-end shops and expensive items such as furs and jewelry. The gang
was both staffed and led by women, who dressed like society ladies to blend in with the
customers of exclusive stores andmade carefully planned raids on extremely expensive items,
using distraction and similar techniques.35 However, professional shoplifters represented a
broad spectrum, including criminals who switched to shoplifting only during sales, when the
looting was easy, and drug addicts and alcoholics seeking means to finance their habits.
Professional shoplifters sometimes worked in teams, using accomplices to take stolen goods
from the store, in case they were stopped and searched. One American store manager stated
that, in nine out of ten cases of professional shoplifting of small items, the person who carried
them from the store was not the one who stole them.36
According to research by Ralph L.Woods, professionals accounted for only around 10 per-
cent of U.S. shoplifters in the late 1930s.37 Mary Cameron’s study gives a similar estimate
(though the average value of thefts was typically much higher).38 Many “amateur” shoplifters
were habitual ones, with a degree of skill, sometimes being caught with shoplifting
“equipment” such as suitable bags and concealedpockets to hide the goods, scissors to remove
price tags, and “shopping lists” of goods to steal.39 However, they were sometimes naïve in
their methods—for example, amateurs often stole multiple items during the same visit, while
professionals stole only single items—as being caughtwithmultiple stolen itemswasharder to
explain away as forgetfulness or a wish to compare the item with others in the store.40
All sources concur that affluent women were overrepresented in the U.S. shoplifter pop-
ulation.41 The gender bias may partly reflect the dominance of women in the stores’ customer
base, but research for this study has not found any examples of shoplifting by male middle-
class amateurs in this era. A similar overrepresentation of middle/upper-class shoplifters was
evident in Britain. For example, in October 1933, Lily Smith, arrested for stealing a 15s.
handbag, was shown in court to be a rich widow, with £40,000 invested in Argentina, a house
in Cardiff, and a boarding house in London. After being told she had over £60 (around ten
weeks’ salary for a clerk or teacher) in her possession when arrested, she was fined £5.42
However, other British judges were less lenient on middle-class shoplifters. In 1920, Emie
Kennedy (the wife of an ex-officer holding a responsible position in the Admiralty), together
with a “lady accomplice,” pleaded guilty to nine months of shoplifting. The pair had been
apprehended at London’s elite Harvey Nichols store, and the subsequent police investigation
35. Meier, “Going on the Hoist.”
36. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters III,” 24–25.
37. Woods, “Slick Fingers,” 273.
38. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 56.
39. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 40–41, 58–59.
40. Sutherland, Professional Thief, 13–14.
41. “The Shoplifting Profession,” New York Times, March 23, 1930, 171.
42. “A Woman of Means,” The Times, 9 October 1933, 11.
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found large quantities of apparel, which the defendants admitted stealing from West End
stores. The magistrate sentenced both to six month’s imprisonment.43
Shoplifting was usually highest in the run-up to Christmas and at Easter, when crowds
thronged the stores. The NYPD publicized the dangers of Christmas shoplifting during the
1920s with mass trials, reported at length in the newspapers. For example, on January
12, 1921, some 176 alleged shoplifters appeared in the New York Court of Special Sessions,
62 of whom were arrested in a single department store. It required two courtrooms to
accommodate them, and about an acre of spacious vestibule to hold their children, rela-
tives, and friends, plus witnesses. Almost all were women, aged sixteen to eighty-two, and
very few were reported to give an outward appearance of poverty. Some were said to be
magnificently dressed. Ninety-eight pleaded guilty, though Chief Justice Kernochan said
that he thought not more than three or four were professional criminals. Yet of those who
pleaded guilty, about twenty were said to have robbed two or three stores before being
apprehended. Most were fined $50 and a total of $2275 was collected on the day, every fine
being paid. Twenty who had shoplifted from more than one store, but had no criminal
record, were sent for imprisonment in “The Tombs” for a day (a common deterrent strategy
in New York).44
Sentencing in Britain and the United States was broadly similar, with a trend away from
prison sentences for first offenders after World War I, following gradually more lenient
sentencing over the nineteenth century.45 Repeat offenders could face short prison terms,
with longer sentences for persistent shoplifters. However, from 1926, habitual New York
shoplifters faced life imprisonment under “Baumes laws,” which made this mandatory for a
fourth offense (a precursor of the 1980s “three strikes and you’re out” legislation). Ruth
St. Clair became the first person to receive a life sentence under this law, in December 1929,
for a fourth shoplifting conviction. This sparked amajor controversy, and in 1937, after serving
seven years, she received a conditional pardon from the state governor, only to be arrested
again for shoplifting in July 1939.46
Employee theft was also said to be substantial, but has left fewer records, as most retailers
regarded dismissal and recovery of the goods an adequate sanction. The New York State
Department of Labor found that this was particularly problematic in variety stores, owing to
low wages and high labor turnover.47 As a retail executive told Chain Store Age in 1926, “We
never try a case in court.Most of our offenders are young fellowswhose liveswedonotwant to
spoil. And we could not get any more than a conviction, suspended sentence on parole or the
like. We doubt if a trial by jury except in an aggravated case would do us any good. Juries are
usually prejudiced against corporations.”48
43. “Nine Months’ Shoplifting,” The Times, November 17, 1920, 4.
44. “175 Shoplifters Crowd Courtroom, New York Times, January 13, 1921, 1.
45. Meier, “Going on the Hoist,” 426–427; Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 188–189;
Whitlock, “Forms ofCrime,” 159; Segrave,Shoplifting, 29;Hadden, “Shoplifters ofManyTypesMinglewith the
Shoppers,” 163.
46. “M’adoo Makes Plea for Mrs. St. Clair,” New York Times, February 9, 1930, 18.
47. Hayward and White, Chain Stores, 528–529.
48. “Coping with Dishonest Employees,” Chain Store Age, General Merchandise Edition 2, no. 9 (1926): 34.
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Acomplicating factorwas a tradition, in older independent stores, of clerks taking stock for
personal consumption—though variety and department stores did not tolerate this practice.49
However, some clerks undertookmuch larger thefts, sometimes in conjunctionwith customer
accomplices.50 Staff fallingunder suspicionwere oftendismissed, evenonweak evidence. For
example, H.L. Green, a variety chain with 130 stores, stated, “It is commonly-accepted good
policy to dismiss a sales clerk whose actions are suspicious, rather than attempt to catch her
with the goods.”51
Why Did Affluent Women Shoplift?
Three popular explanations have been proposed for the disproportionate number of appar-
ently prosperous women shoplifters: illness; “need,” in terms of having insufficient control
over money to keep up appearances; and being “entrapped” by irresistible displays of sump-
tuous goods.
Kleptomania had been a popular early explanation. The “kleptomania defense” reached its
zenith in the late nineteenth century, vigorously promoted by amedical profession that could
free a prosperous woman from shoplifting charges by medical diagnosis. By the interwar era,
the definition of kleptomania had strayed beyond the specific medical condition that
nineteenth-century psychiatrists claimed to have identified. It was now typically expressed
in terms of impulsiveness, stress, or mental illness, only the last of which could meet the
original clinical definition. Some female defendants even asserted they had stolen impul-
sively, for the excitement—extending the definition to a form of “extreme shopping,” which
they felt was justified by their motivation. Even this variant of kleptomania received some
support from a medical profession that was indirectly profiting from shoplifting, using argu-
ments that the dazzle and luxury of palatial department stores aroused uncontrollable desires
for possession.52 However, this was a particularly middle-class defense, as only affluent
women could afford expert medical testimony. Moreover, as Elaine Abelson noted, while it
offered a way of reconciling shoplifting with middle-class respectability, it “profoundly
undermined the self-respect ofwomen as individuals and as a group,” transforming the female
shoplifter into a childlike figure who could not control her own impulses.53
By the interwar era, kleptomania was wearing thin with most judges, who increasingly
rejected the distinction between the middle-class “kleptomaniac” and the working-class
“thief.” Kerry Segrave argues that the kleptomania defense had largely disappeared by 1920
in the United States.54 Newspaper reports suggest that it was still used occasionally in British
courts, but that judges often gave it short shrift. For example, in July 1934, Phyllis Cochrane
pleaded guilty to stealing a frock and a dress from two leading London stores. Sir Henry Curtis
Bennett, KC, defending, noted that she had recently lost her husband, a man of “some
49. Bentley Historical Library, Butler Brothers, Manual, 117.
50. Ibid., 119.
51. Woods, “Slick Fingers,” 277.
52. Meier, “Going on the Hoist,” 425; Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 215–216.
53. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 149 (quote), 150–151.
54. Segrave, Shoplifting, 26.
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position,” and that her mental state had become unstable. However, the magistrate sentenced
her to threemonths’ imprisonment (concurrently) on each charge, stating that, if she had been
a poor woman, she would not have been able to brief eminent counsel and call evidence as to
her state of mind. He must regard her as a person responsible for her actions.55
Similarly, in June 1920, Elizabeth Barker, aged forty-four, stood accused at North London
Police Court of shoplifting a man’s suit of clothes. Her barrister claimed that Barker “had
arrived at that point of life whenwomen did curious things” (a reference to kleptomania being
associated with the onset of the menopause). However, a detective-sergeant testified that she
had been previously convicted of shoplifting and that he believed her to be an expert thief.
Despite the court being informed that her husband was “a most respectable man,” she was
sentenced to a month’s imprisonment with hard labor.56
Explanations framed around “need” appear to have been honestly advanced and probably
contained some truth in a proportion of cases—though the definition of “need” was broad,
based on maintaining a lifestyle expected by her peer group. Late nineteenth-century
U.S. sources reviewed by Abelson noted that apparently affluent women did not have control
over their own money and, allotted insufficient cash by their husbands or fathers, turned to
shoplifting to “keep up” socially.57 Similar explanations were put forward in the interwar era.
A 1930 New York Times article suggested, “Perhaps a woman, having received an allowance
from her husband, has gambled it away at bridge and must yet be able to give some other
account of how she spent the money. She goes to a department store and steals lingerie,
hosiery, cheap jewelry, or dresses.”58
Similar explanations were advanced in Britain. A commissionaire at a large London
department store reported hearing “any number of cases of ladies who, as far as appearances
go, arewell to do, but in reality they are kept very short of readymoney, and to those ladies the
possibility of being able to get a roll of ribbon or a pair of gloves for nothing is a temptation.”59
However, this would not explain why prosperous women would have greater “need” to steal
than their lower-middle-class and working-class counterparts, for whom making ends meet
was a much harder task.
Arguments drawing on consumer culture theory explain shoplifting in terms of the intense
commercial culture of department stores, which “entrapped” customers with irresistible
displays, calculated to generate the very desire that turned otherwise respectable women into
thieves. Similar explanations were common from the late nineteenth century.60 Some British
judges became unlikely advocates of this explanation. For example, in March 1937, several
shoplifters at the M&S Brixton (south London) store, were brought before magistrate Claude
Mullins—whohad famously denouncedM&S’s opendisplay format (Figure 1).61 J. D. Cassells,
representing M&S, said that each week about fifteen to twenty thousand people visited their
55. “Theft of Two Dresses,” The Times, July 26, 1934, 4.
56. “The Dangerous Age,” The Times of London, June 15, 1920, 13.
57. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 166–167.
58. “The Shoplifting Profession,” New York Times, March 23, 1930, 171.
59. “Shoplifting on the Increase,” London Journal, April 14, 1906, 323.
60. Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 192–230; Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving,
61–78.
61. Briggs, Marks & Spencer, 85.
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Brixton store, which was protected by shop assistants, managerial staff, seven floorwalkers,
and one or two detectives. Some women came with the deliberate intention of stealing, and it
was difficult for the firm to protect itself.
Mullins replied: “Thismodernmethodof display is…more than averagehumannature can
resist. Most of these people are not really criminals, and I feel that the people who place
temptation in their way are, to some extent, responsible.”62 Similarly, a Sheffield magistrate
suggested in 1935 that firms such asM&S should have a systemof grids, as in the PostOffice, to
deter shoplifters. He argued that M&Smade no “effort whatever to protect their goods…They
collar the thief and send him here for the Bench to waste time on their behalf.”63
In 1933, Londonmagistrate Ivan Snell visited several stores where shoplifting was rife. His
predecessor had unsuccessfully tried to reduce shoplifting by imposing prison sentences
(except in exceptional circumstances). Snell’s visits convinced him that the stores were at
fault. In court, having imposed fines from £2 to £5 on six women shoplifters, he announced
that rather than being dressed as ordinary customers, detectives should wear distinctive
uniforms to show that a watch was being kept. In apparently unpoliced stores, “decent law-
abiding women, wives and mothers, are being tempted … by their methods of display.”64
Snell also suggested that there should be notices to the effect that detectives were watching
and shoplifters would be prosecuted.65 However, a Times article argued that such methods
Figure 1. Open display at the M&S Birmingham store, January 1933.
Source: Reproduced by kind permission of the M&S Company Archive (image P1/1/29/11).
62. “Shoplifting at Marks and Spencer’s,” Norwood News, March 5, 1937, 9.
63. “Shop-lifting Sheffield J.P.’s Advice to Big Store,” Sheffield Independent, April 16, 1935, 5.
64. “Thefts at London Stores,” The Times, May 5, 1933, 11. Similar comments were made by other judges,
e.g., “Open-access Stores Again Under Fire,” 20.
65. “Thefts at London stores,” The Times, May 5, 1933, 11.
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wouldput off customers: “There is a natural dislike of going into a placewhere it seems that the
virtuous and the unvirtuous are regarded alike as potential criminals. Nor when the art of
displaying goods has reached its present pitch is it certain that proposals for diminishing its
ingenuity are likely to be acceptable; less liberal display might … be regarded by many
shopkeepers as a retrograde step.”66 Deterrence was thus not allowed to get in the way of
creating the right customer environment and thereby maximizing sales.
American judicial condemnations of opendisplaywere rare, probably due to suchmethods
having been used since the 1870s, while in Britain they only really took off in the 1910s.
However, criticismwas not entirely absent. In November 1920, NewYork justice John Freschi
noted, “My experience on the bench has shown that seven out of every ten shoplifters are
tempted by the display of articles, apparently unprotected. Like Snell, he recommended large
warning signs and uniformed detectives.67 His two fellow judges concurred, arguing that store
proprietors should seek to prevent shoplifting rather than confine their efforts to arrest and
prosecution.
However, explanations based on stores beguiling and entrapping female customers into
theft have similarities with the interwar version of the kleptomania defense—fundamentally
casting women as impulsive, childlike figures, who were distinguished from men by their
inability to resist the lure of attractive merchandise.68 A more convincing explanation was
proposed by Cameron, whose book, based on her doctoral thesis, was one of the first substan-
tial sociological investigations of shoplifting. She argued that amateur shoplifter practices
such as bringing shoplifting equipment, having plans for evading detection, and destroying
evidence such as price tags, did not suggest a sudden loss of control.69 Amateur shoplifters,
she argued, suffered from what we would now call cognitive dissonance, whereby the perpe-
trators—usually having a self-image of a law-abiding citizen—did not regard their thefts as
crimes, until they faced arrest. However, the shame associated with arrest and potential
prosecution led to a radical re-assessment of their behavior, especially as—unlike professional
criminals—their actions would be unlikely to find support from their peer group. This,
Cameron argued, accounted for the low re-offending rate among amateur shoplifters.70
Cameron concluded that amateur shoplifting was essentially another form of “white-collar
crime,” a phenomenon typically ascribed tomen, for whom it encompassed behaviors such as
embezzling, overcharging clients, padding expenses, and stealing office supplies—activities
similarly not seen as “crimes” by the perpetrators. This was corroborated by the types of
merchandise amateur shoplifters stole—typically items that could be worn as status sym-
bols.71 It also explains the frequent statements of apprehended shoplifters that they stole
because everyone else was doing so,72 an argument often used bymalewhite-collar criminals,
who regarded packing expenses claims or taking office supplies as awidespread and accepted
66. “Shoplifting,” The Times, May 6, 1933, 13.
67. “Says Stores Lure Thieves,” New York Times, November 24, 1920, 8.
68. Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 215–223.
69. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch,120, 145–146, 150–158.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 74.
72. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 62.
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“perk.”The “entitlement” justification of thefts by regular store customerswas capturedby the
slang term “five-finger discount,” that had come into popular parlance by the 1960s.73
Whilemalewhite-collar criminals sought higher income, and the social status flowing from
this, by stealing primarily money to gain advantage in the race of “getting on,”women did so
more directly, by taking the status items they desired. Thus, rather than rejectingmiddle-class
norms, they were trying to gain a better position in the middle-class hierarchy by pilfering
items that were, in Bourdieu’s terminology, “symbolic” to their peer group.74 This also
resonates with the “need” explanation, outlined earlier, which focuses not on absolute needs,
but status-driven needs. Shoplifting can thus be seen as the extreme end of a spectrum of
opportunistic shopping practices, such as buying a dress to wear once and then returning it.75
However, another significant element of middle-class amateur shoplifting was omitted in
Cameron’s analysis—the thrill reported by its practitioners, which appears to have repre-
sented a significant subsidiary motive. As Wood noted in 1939, for many affluent women,
shoplifting represented, “a lark, an adventure, and only secondarily a crime,” again demon-
strating cognitive dissonance between the person’s actions and their implications.76 It thus
had a strong “ludic” element (enjoyment from playing the game)—akin to gambling, except
that the stake was the player’s social reputation and, possibly, liberty.
Turning the Tables: Shoplifters Suing Stores
In bothBritain andAmerica, nineteenth-century shoplifting cases involving rich andpowerful
women graphically illustrated the perils that stores faced when pressing prosecutions. This
reflected not only the power-distance between such women and the typically lower-middle-
class shopkeepers who made the allegations, but a more general belief that a “lady” of high
position and feminine respectability was incapable of such crimes.77 One particularly influ-
ential case involved Jane Tyrwhitt, a wealthy married woman with connections to the aris-
tocracy, accused of stealing an inexpensive microscope from London’s Soho Bazaar in
November 1844. Despite strong evidence against her and her only defense being that she
would have no reason to commit such a crime, she was nevertheless acquitted.78 Moreover,
the retailer endured ferocious public condemnation, including a letter-writing campaign in
The Times. In addition to arguments that a woman of her station would be incapable of such a
crime, some correspondents inferred that it must have been planted on her by the shop-
keeper.79
Despite an allegedly more egalitarian culture in the United States, elite Victorian Ameri-
cans reacted in the same way when one of their own was caught shoplifting, as seen in
December 1870, when five women, including the wealthy philanthropist Mary Phelps, were
73. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 9.
74. Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital.”
75. Abelson When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 57–58.
76. Woods, “Slick Fingers,” 273.
77. Whitlock, Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 1–3, 213.
78. Ibid., 143–134.
79. Ibid., 144–147.
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arrested for shoplifting at Macy’s. All charges were dismissed at the Special Sessions Police
Court, while Macy’s, its management, and its employees were denounced in newspaper
articles and letters—again on the “evidence” that the women’s social position and good
character made such behavior unthinkable. Thereafter, for many years, Macy’s and other
prominent New York stores were generally unwilling to prosecute “lady” shoplifters.80
Stores also faced direct financial costs. In 1878, aMrs. Davis was awarded $150 in damages
for being wrongly accused of stealing a purse from a New York store, leading to her being
forcibly detained and searched.81 Over the following decades, the damages requested and
received for wrongful arrest (often in conjunctionwith false imprisonment and slander) in the
United Statesmultiplied, acting as a significant deterrent to apprehension, unless therewas an
airtight case. An extreme example involved Mrs. Theresa Kirches, who in March 1929 sued
F. &W. Grant Company inNewYork’s Queens SupremeCourt for $100,000 for false arrest and
the resulting humiliation and mental anguish. The incident involved the alleged theft of two
nightgowns, charges that she was later acquitted of. Unfortunately, the New York Times,
which carried the story of the first day of the trial, did not report the outcome.82
By the 1920s, department stores had become wary of criminals who sought to be falsely
accused so that they could bring a case against a store.83 Variety stores were particularly
attractive targets, given the deep pockets of the major variety chains and strong antagonism
from local business communities—who often dominated juries. It was widely perceived that
the expanding chains were driving independent retailers out of business. Several states and
municipalities introduced taxes on chain stores, together with restrictions on their selling and
pricing policies.84 Opposition intensified during the Depression, as the variety chains, facing
market saturation for their traditional five-and-dime merchandise, moved into higher-value
goods, in direct competition with department stores that were often regarded as local institu-
tions.
Department stores were already struggling to generate an acceptable profit during the
1920s.85 However, the Depression saw department store operating profits collapse to a low
of 7.6 percent of sales revenue in 1932, while the sector reported losses in six of the eleven
years from 1930 to 1940, in contrast to healthy profits for the variety stores. Meanwhile,
department store andvariety store sales, set at 1929=100 (see Figure 2), diverged substantially
during the 1930s, with the variety stores’ sales index climbing to 110.1 by 1935, while the
department store index fell to 74.4.86
Variety store chains perceived themselves to be under siege from criminals who could get
considerable damages, sometimes for alleged thefts involving goods costing only a few cents.
These included not only criminals, but people genuinely falsely arrested, as the large payouts
for such cases were prominently reported in the newspapers. Meanwhile the criminal
80. Ebelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving,” 120–124.
81. Segrave, Shoplifting, 8.
82. “Woman Asks $100,000 in Shoplifting Case,”New York Times, March 22, 1929, 18. Unfortunately the
outcome was not reported, possibly due to Grant settling the case.
83. Coffin, Letters and Confessions, 107.
84. Hypps, “Department Store,” 77–78.; Elvins, Sales and Celebrations, 103–104.
85. McNair and May, “American Department Store,” 22–23.
86. No survey was conducted for 1930.
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community was well informed of new rackets such as this, as there were strong information
flows between criminal gangs, even rival ones.87As a Kresge 1935 memorandum to all their
stores noted:
We have just lost a suit for assault and slander allegedly committed by a floorman resulting in
a verdict of $2,500 plus expenses of over $600. Another case is pending because an assistant
manager falsely accused [a customer] and placed his hands upon the wrong party. Our
attention has been called to a verdict against one of our competitors for damages amounting
to $5,700 because of the humiliation and suffering resulting in a false arrest. The theft of a ten-
cent item was the issue.88
The letter urged store managers to use utmost discretion; to avoid accusing anyone of
stealing under any circumstances; to not place hands on or search customers; and to not ask
anyone to sign confessions or releases. Suspects should instead be asked courteously and
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Figure 2. Data on net sales (1929 = 100) and operating profits (percentage of net sales) for identical
samples of fifteen variety store chains and seventy-six department stores, 1929–1940.
Sources: Variety stores: Teele, “Expenses and Profits of Limited Price Variety Chains in 1938,” 5, 8; Burnham, “Expenses
and Profits of Limited Price Variety Chains in 1942,” 32–33. Department stores: McNair and May, “American Depart-
ment Store,” 26–27.
87. Sutherland, Professional Thief, 8–9, 16–21.
88. Bentley Historical Library, S. S. Kresge Company records, roll 6, 26, “Searching and Accusing
(Prevention Is Best),” general letter to all Kresge stores by C. E. Holzworth, April 2, 1935.
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merchandise must be wrapped before leaving the store.89 Similarly, the Butler Brothers chain
advised its staff that in apprehending shoplifters, “you have thrown yourself open to liability
for damages in event you lose your case. Conscientious and sinceremerchants havemore than
once sustained heavy losses in such damage suits.”90
A 1953 review of cases stretching back to the 1930s noted that shoplifting false arrest
judgments for several thousand dollars were fairly common, while many cases were settled
out of court for substantial amounts.91 It also noted the prevalence of bogus false arrest
frauds.92 Stores that detained alleged shoplifters could face charges of assault and battery,
slander, or insulting language.93 However, the main charge was typically unlawful arrest, for
which damages could include loss of time, physical discomfort and injury, mental anguish
from humiliation, and injury to reputation.94
Even obtaining the services of a policeman was no safeguard against lawsuits. One
U.S. variety store, plagued by shoplifters who operated on Saturday afternoons and evenings
when the storewas busy, asked the chief of police to assign auniformedofficer at those times—
paying $10 a day for his services. Shortly afterward, the policeman detected an alleged
shoplifter, who ran from the door on seeing him. The suspect was eventually apprehended
after the policeman had fired his gun. However, the case was dismissed on account of insuf-
ficient evidence, and he sued the store for $50,000, being awarded $5700 by the jury.95 Local
attitudes toward chains moving into town were said to have unduly impacted the size of
damages. As the article continued, “We ask our managers to remember that whenever a chain
is involved in a court action by a resident of a small city it runs the danger of facing an
unfriendly jury.”96 Anti-chain prejudice was also noted in the academic law literature.97
While some suits involved genuine false arrest, manywere perpetrated by skilled thieves. In
1934, a store manager reported, “Several forms of racket based on possession of merchandise,
such as the bringing of merchandise into the store in an effort to bait the manager intomaking a
false accusation.”98 Even the most low-key approach to a suspected shoplifter could be pre-
sented very differently in court, where “a quiet inquiry by themerchant as to the contents of the
plaintiff’s shopping bagmay become a shouted accusation of theft overheard by everyone in the
store, and a tap on the shoulder may become a violent seizure resulting in grave mental
suffering.”99 Similarly, a request to have the goods wrapped should be carefully worded to
ensure there was no accusation, direct or implied. The traditional practice of taking a suspect
into a closed room for an interview was also unsafe, as it might be construed as an “arrest,”
especially by a jury that “is disposed to favor the culprit becauseof antagonism to the chains.”100
89. Ibid.
90. Bentley Historical Library, Butler Brothers, Manual, 115.
91. Anon, “Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest, 797–799.
92. Ibid., 797.
93. Anon, “Protection and Recapture of Merchandise,” 887.
94. Anon, “Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest,” 798.
95. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters: II,” 26.
96. Ibid.
97. Anon, “Protection and Recapture of Merchandise,” 887.
98. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters III,” 24–25.
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Some scams involved accomplices, such as the “information racket.” One recited case
involved awomanwho told an assistantmanager a particularmanhadpickedupapocketbook
and hidden it under his coat. The assistant manager, seeing a suspicious bulge on the man’s
person, trailed himout of the store. On the strength of thewoman’s charge, he stopped theman
andwas allegedly tricked intomaking an accusation. Therewas no pocketbook on the suspect,
and when the assistant looked for the informant, she had disappeared, leading to a lawsuit
“that was expensive for us.”101
A simpler but effective stratagemwas to steal an itemand thenpass it to an accomplice. One
such account involved a gang of shoplifters, with a blindmanmaking the initial theft. This led
to a lawsuit for heavy damages, given that the manager had made a direct accusation and
searched the suspect. Investigation disclosed that managers of other stores had noticed the
blindman and his party and felt certain hewas a thief. Yet the company realized that it was an
extremely dangerous case, with insufficient proof, and therefore settled out of court for a sum
“that cut heavily into the store’s net profits for December.”102
The Fix
In addition to local anti-chain bias, legal system corruption was also a factor in damages suits,
at least in certain localities. For example, Mary Felder, aged eighteen, was arrested leaving
S.Klein’s store inNewYorkwearing adress shehadnot paid for (her olddress being concealed
in a cardboard box she carried). She admitted taking the dress on arrest and at the police
station. Felder was arraigned before New York magistrate Jesse Silbermann. Her attorney,
Mark Alter, who specialized in Women’s Court litigation, was a close friend of Silbermann.
Silbermann discharged the case, after which a perplexed Samuel Klein sought an interview
with Silbermann, then his superiors, regarding the decision. The case was reheard, under
Silbermann, who again dismissed the charges.103
Felder then sued Klein’s for false arrest and imprisonment, though the suit was later
withdrawn when it was discovered that her mother had been convicted twice for shoplifting.
This case featured in the famous “Seabury investigations” into corruption in the New York
judicial systemandpolice force,withSeabury charging thatMaryFelder hadbeen acquitted in
order to create the damages suit, in which Alter had a financial interest.104 Silbermann was
also investigated regarding the acquittal of Minnie Hansaty, another alleged shoplifter at
Klein’s, in what the firm considered an airtight case, contributing to his removal from the
bench.105 A hint regarding similar practices may underlie Woods’s 1939 comment that
“Macy’s discovered that too often first offenderswhowereprosecutedwere ‘sprung’by lenient
judges and that lawsuits for false arrests sometimes followed.”106
101. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters III,” 50.
102. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Holiday Shoplifters,” 29.
103. “Corruption,” Time Magazine, 30, 1 (January 5, 1931): 13; Mackaye, Tin Box Parade, 79–82.
104. Ibid., 82.
105. Ibid., 83.
106. Woods, “Slick Fingers,” 274.
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False arrest claims and the acquittals that preceded them were facilitated by a preexisting
formof legal systemcorruption: “the fix.”Career criminal Chic Conwell claimed, in the classic
criminology text The Professional Thief, that “fixers” could arrange for professional shop-
lifters to escape conviction (or get away with a fine) in virtually all parts of the United States.
This involved bribing the arresting officer or, where this was not possible, the prosecutor or
(more rarely) the judge. This service was only available to professional thieves, while the
much larger number of amateur shoplifting cases provided “cover” for fixed cases by main-
taining satisfactory conviction rates for police and prosecutors.107 He also claimed that store
detectives could be bribed, their corruption again being camouflaged by high conviction rates
for amateur shoplifters.108 Detectives provided by themajor agencieswere also said to be open
to bribery, except the Pinkerton’s, who worked for “honour more than money.”109 The prev-
alence of the fix was also discussed in a 1953 Yale Law Review article on shoplifting and the
law of arrest.110 Cameron reported that the fix was still rife in Chicago in the 1960s, with
specialist fixer attorneys being paid regular retainers for this service.111
In Britain, by contrast, while many judges were not above bias and favoritism, there is no
evidence of the type of wholesale financial corruption for low-level career criminals that
occurred in some U.S. cities.112 Moreover, Britain had a tradition of paying more modest
damages, which were sufficiently high to deter store malpractice, but did not pose so large a
threat that managers felt intimidated from apprehending in clear cases of theft. In May 1935,
Gwendoline Humfrey was awarded £800 ($3920) damages from Woolworths UK for false
imprisonment, slander, and assault following anunsuccessful shoplifting prosecution,which,
she claimed, resulted inher losing the chanceof a position as a governess.However, therewere
exceptional circumstances—asWoolworths had persisted in their charge, taking advantage of
court privilege, therefore “damagesmust be heavy to prove to theworld her innocence.”113All
other successful cases reviewed by the author involved smaller damages, from £20 to £300
($98 to $1470).114 Thus both the incentives for and the capability to engineer bogus false arrest
claims were substantially weaker in Britain than in the United States.
However, Britain was not completely free of bogus arrest suits. On October 19, 1936,
Rebecca (a.k.a. Rene) Stone, a taxicab proprietor, visited theWest End department store Swan
& Edgar. Stone moved between departments for about an hour without making any purchase.
A female storedetective became suspicious andobservedher pickingupapink garment before
leaving the store. The detective apprehended her and asked her to come back to the store, but
107. Sutherland, Professional Thief, 83–92.
108. Ibid., 103.
109. Ibid., 128.
110. Anon, “Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest,” 791.
111. Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch, 48–49.
112. Sutherland, Professional Thief, 122.
113. “Woolworths to Pay £800 Damages,” Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, May 30, 1935, 3.
114. “StoreMust Pay £300,”BradfordObserver, November 23, 1939, 2; “Kings BenchDivision. Damages for
a Charge of Shoplifting. Weaver and Another v. Daniels,” The Times, February 14, 1920, 4; “Claim for Damages
Against Corporation Fails,” Sheffield Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1930, 12; “Damages for an Ex-councillor,”
Hartlepool Northern Daily, August 10, 1933, 2; “£250 Damages. Widow Sues Store for Malicious Prosecution,”
Norwood News, January 17, 1936, 22. Exchange rate is for 1935. Source: Lawrence H. Officer, “Dollar–Pound
Exchange Rate from 1791.”
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she refused, stating that the goods she carried had been given to her by a friend, whose name
she declined to divulge. The police were called, and she was arrested and taken to Vine Street
police station. Several items were found on her person, including two slips (one pink) but the
store staff were unable to identify any of them as store property. She was released, with an
apology.
It emerged that Stone had previously obtained a settlement of £500 from the catering chain
J. Lyons & Company on account of illness after her mouth was cut with a piece of tin found in
their baked beans. Meanwhile Swan & Evans received an anonymous letter, stating that Stone
was planning tomake false allegations against the store and disclosing the Lyons settlement—
though this arrived some nine days after the arrest. Stone sued for assault and false impris-
onment; despite the police strongly suspecting that she had “arrangedher own arrest,”Swan&
Edgar settled the case out of court for £250, plus costs, partly to avoid bad publicity.115
Deterrence
Both the risk of unlawful arrest suits and the financial and staff time costs of prosecutions
incentivized increased use of deterrence rather than legal remedies, where possible.
New York’s S. Klein’s store—the world’s largest women’s clothing store and a New York
institution famous for its low prices—was an extreme example, using large, prominently
displayed signs with slogans such as “The Penalty for Dishonesty Is Jail” in several lan-
guages.116 However, as with many of Klein’s retail practices, it was an exception, with most
stores using more subtle methods that would deter shoplifters while not upsetting other
customers.
The key personnel in the war against the shoplifter, imposter (who charged goods to
someone else’s account), and dishonest employee were the plainclothes store detectives.
Private detective agencies emerged in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century and
experienced rapid growth in the postbellum era, receiving much business from the new
corporations. Much of their work involved monitoring workers’ honesty and union activities
through undercover surveillance. Detectives were soon hired by the big stores, either through
agencies or, more commonly, as direct employees.117 Employee detectives were sometimes
drawn from the ranks of police officers, butmore typically from the sales staff.Macy’s hired its
first female store detective in 1870, but men comprised the bulk of store detectives until after
1945.118 London also had female store detectives before1914, described in a 1911 article as
being “so skillful in their disguises that even themost notorious female shop thieves often fail
to recognize the detective, even when she is standing close behind them in a crowd.”119
Squads of store detectives in New York were reported in 1930 to vary from half a dozen in
the smaller stores to 100 in one very large department store, thus representing a significant
115. W. Parker, divisional detective inspector to superintendent, December 9, 1936, National Archives,
MEPO 6/142.
116. Mackaye, Tin Box Parade, 78; Woods, “Slick Fingers,” 274.
117. Fronc, New York Undercover, 11–12.
118. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 130; Segrave, Shoplifting, 12.
119. “Shoplifting on the Increase,” London Journal, May 6, 1911, 47.
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business cost.120 This was partly a seasonal trade, with extra detectives recruited around
Thanksgiving.121 Detectives relied heavily on salespeople, who they viewed as shrewd judges
of their customers, to point out suspicious behavior. Some stores incentivized sales staff via
monetary rewards for items retrieved, in proportion to their value, a technique used in
Marshall Field’s by 1911.122
Stores also banded together for mutual protection. From the eighteenth century, British
retailers had organized to protect themselves from shoplifting and fraud via “trade protection
societies” that shared knowledge of fraudulent practices and circulated the names, dates,
locations, descriptions, and modus operandi of offenders. These sometimes also offered
rewards for the apprehension of shoplifters and financial support for prosecutions.123
New York’s Stores Mutual Protective Association both worked directly to suppress sho-
plifting and acted as a clearinghouse for information on active shoplifters.124 From its estab-
lishment in around 1918 to 1933, it had amassed fifty-five thousand names of offenders. Stores
could check apprehended shoplifters against their records; if no recordwas found, theymight
be released following a confession, but those already listed usually faced prosecution. By
1933, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Atlanta had similar systems.125
However, stores were also in competition on deterrence to develop “a wholesome respect
for the store!” in the eyes of the professional shoplifting community.126 Many anti-theft
deviceswere simple and invisible to the ordinary customer, such aswrapping allmerchandise
at the point of sale (to show it had been paid for) or using standardized, symmetrical displays
(so that any removed article would be immediately noted).127 However, adjusting display
techniques to guard against shoplifting was not allowed to get in the way of maximizing sales.
As one shop executive noted, “The advertising value of the high ornamental [display] struc-
tures … is often of sufficient importance to warrant use in spite of a subsequent increase in
shoplifting.”128
Another anti-theft device involved wiring merchandise to bells beneath the counters. A
cord was run around the bottom articles in the bin, then down through the bottom of the
counter, where it was wired to an electric alarm bell. This was designed to catch professional
shoplifters who cleared out an entire merchandise bin in one go. This was said to be an
effective deterrent, as even if the shoplifter left with some goods, he or she would be unlikely
to return.129 Prevention was key; as another retail executive explained, “As a general rule we
do not want our managers to go any further than the quiet questioning of suspects and the
securing of signed statements. We want them to prevent theft rather than to prosecute it.”130
120. “The Shoplifting Profession,” New York Times, March 23, 1930, 171.
121. Hadden, “Shoplifters of Many Types Mingle with the Shoppers,” 163.
122. Duncan, “Control of Stock Shortages,” 284–285; Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving, 115.
123. Whitlock,Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture, 131–132, 155–158;Whitlock, “Forms of Crime,” 162.
124. “Stores Open War on Amateur Pilferers,” New York Times, July 11, 1920, 43.
125. Hadden, “Shoplifters of Many Types Mingle with the Shoppers,” 163.
126. Keeley, “Preventing Pilferage,” 29.
127. Hayward andWhite, Chain Stores, 528–529; Bentley Historical Library, Butler Brothers,Manual, 117;
Duncan, “Control of Stock Shortages,” 280.
128. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters, IV,” 29.
129. Keeley, “Preventing Pilferage,” 29.
130. Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters III,” 48.
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Professional shoplifters were more likely to be prosecuted than amateurs, but were also
often dealt with by other means, partly to avoid lawsuits. As one executive explained, “Two
things enable us to handle the specialists in … [a] somewhat summary way without inviting
lawsuits against us. First, there is the technique we use in catching them without laying
ourselves open to trouble. We don’t accuse them of stealing. We note where they have hidden
the article or articles, point to the location and say, ‘Would you like to have the articles
wrapped which you have there?’After the opening step the rest is easy because the petty thief
of this type, caught dead to rights, is so frightened that he is amenable to almost any
suggestion.” 131
Authority to take action against shoplifters was typically restricted to only a few, well-
trained staff. A 1934 W. T. Grant training manual instructed salesgirls: “NEVER ACCUSE
ANYONE OF THEFT OR DISHONESTY. If you suspect anyone of trying to shop lift, you may
approach her and say, ‘Do youwishme towrap that scarf?’ or ‘Do youwishme towait on you?’
If you are suspicious of anyone in the store, report all the facts PROMPTLY ANDQUIETLY to
the floorman.”132 Even when policemen were invited into the store to help deter shoplifters,
they were carefully briefed by the manager:
pointing out the danger ofmaking an arrest inside the store, the danger of accusing, directly or
by inference, anyonewhomay be taking goods to daylight for closer examination or whomay
be comparing goods on one counter with those on another to match colors … the policeman
cannot be forbidden to make arrests because it is his sworn duty to arrest anyone he sees
committing a crime. Themanagermust, however, discusswith the policeman the policies we
follow in handling shoplifting cases, pointing out that we are far more interested in prevent-
ing theft than in prosecuting thieves.133
British stores appear tohave been somewhatmore ready tobringprosecutions, possibly due
to the lower typical damages in false arrest suits compared with the United States. In 1934,
M&S employed 14 detectives, who were responsible for some 1048 shoplifting prosecutions
(359 of whomwere apprehended in Glasgow) in its 199 stores and for discovering 156 cases of
staff dishonesty.134 During 1937, theymade 2338 apprehensions, comprising 1986 adults and
352 juveniles. The vast majority of adult shoplifters were prosecuted.135 Most M&S store
detectiveswerepermanently based at the larger storeswhere shopliftingwas rife, but anumber
worked in amobile capacity, spending a fewweeks at each store (called in at the request of the
branch accountants).136 Woolworths UK also switched to a more aggressive policy toward
shoplifting from August 1928, in the face of extensive thefts by gangs of juveniles.137
131. Keeley “Preventing Pilferage,” 29.
132. W. T. Grant Co., Manual for Saleswomen, 24 (emphasis in original).
133. “Landau, “Pitfalls to Avoid in Coping with Shoplifters: II,” 27.
134. Marks and Spencer Company Archive, E7/24, J. A. Berger, “Confidential Report to the Directors on the
Conduct of the Administration for 1934,” January 19, 1935.
135. Ibid.
136. Marks and Spencer Company Archive, E7/24, Annual Report of Joint Secretary & Chief Accountant,
1937.
137. University of Reading, Woolworths UK Archive, Executive Committee minute book, vol. 1, August
22, 1928, 136.
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Conclusions
The retailers’ dilemma was that the very attributes that made a visit to a department store or
large variety store enjoyable—its leisure appeal,with noobligation topurchase and freedom to
browse a wide variety of attractive goods without the sales assistant breathing down their
necks—were the same factors that attracted the shoplifter. Moreover, the greatest threat to the
retailers’merchandise came from the ranks of their own customers—many of whom regarded
occasional pilfering in the stores they frequented as legitimate—an extension of shopping
behaviors such as opportunistically buying a dresswith the aimof returning it after it had been
worn for a prestigious event, or even buying and returning it just before a sale, with an
expectation that it could be repurchased at a sale discount.
Open display was integral to department and variety store business models, influencing
every aspect of the business, from store layout to the numbers and roles of staff. Moreover,
open display reduced staff costs, while increasing stockturn, thereby raising profitability.
However, this system had changed the “ecosystems” of the stores, creating ecological niches
for not only shoplifters, but other criminals, such as pickpockets and imposters, to flourish. To
address this, the big stores had introduced store detectives and a variety of other measures to
diminish stock “shrinkage,” but always with an eye to the bottom line. Stores made a clear
distinction between the professional shoplifter who stole goods for sale, often targeting high-
valuemerchandise, and the “amateur”whowas often a regular customer. The latter should be
deterred from stealing but not necessarily from patronizing the store, unless they proved
persistent. Even then, being blacklisted was often used in preference to the costly business
of prosecution.
However, the high damages awarded for false arrests and related charges in the United
States proved an increasing threat. This incentivized litigation from both professional
criminals who designed scams that would lead to their arrest and people who had
genuinely been wrongly accused but might have been satisfied with an apology if they
had not been aware of the generous damages sometimes awarded by the courts. America
was (and is) a much more litigious society than Britain, with lawyers comprising 0.113
percent of the 1930 population, compared with only 0.047 for England and Wales in 1931,
partly owing to Britain’s lower financial incentives for lawsuits.138 Moreover, in Depres-
sion America, damages were inflated by the antagonism of local business elites—who
featured prominently on juries—to variety chains that were squeezing local retailers’
profits. Furthermore, at least in some large cities, legal system corruption paved the
way for bogus false arrest suits.
In the United States, fears of litigation deterred stores from apprehending suspects, even in
clear-cut cases. Conversely, such lawsuits weremuch less common in Britain, probably due to
the lower damages typically awarded, a less litigious culture, and no equivalent of the fix as a
means of engineering shoplifting acquittals that opened the door to false arrest suits. However,
while some British stores, such asM&S andHarrods, “considered it the best form of insurance
138. Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States,
Volume 5, General Report on Occupations, 576; United Kingdon, “1931 Census of England and Wales Occu-
pational Tables,” A Vision of Britain Through Time.
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to prosecute,” this does not appear to have acted as a substantial deterrent.139 Like the office
worker who knows that expense claims are rarely checked by the line manager, many shop-
pers continued to regard a counter of desirable items with no apparent oversight as an
invitation to tip the balance of trade with the store in their favor by avoiding the bothersome
intermediation of the cash till.
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